This paper presents a context-sensitive, inclusion-based, field-sensitive points-to analysis for C, which we use to detect and prevent program security vulnerabilities. In addition to a conservative points-to analysis, we propose an optimistic analysis that assumes a more restricted C semantics reflecting common C usage in order to increase the precision of the analysis.
INTRODUCTION
Software vulnerabilities in C programs have led to tremendous losses of productivity and have caused damages estimated in billions of dollars. These vulnerabilities often stem from the lack of type safety in the C language, with buffer overflows and format string exploits being two well-known security vulnerabilities. Tools exist which audit programs for vulnerabilities; however, the unsafe nature of C makes it difficult to create precise software analysis tools which minimize false warnings.
Program auditing tools usually depend on the results of a pointer alias analysis. The semantics of C can cause a sound pointer analysis to generate many false points-to relations. Existing software checkers often minimize false positive warnings by using an unsound pointer analysis instead. The Metal compiler and the Intrinsa system, known to find numerous serious vulnerabilities in widely used operating systems, assume that pointers are unaliased until proven otherwise with a local analysis [4, 9] . The same assumption was used in a buffer overflow detection tool by Wagner et al. [18] . However, by making such unsound assumptions, an auditing tool may not find all possible vulnerabilities and cannot be used to guarantee that a program is safe. This paper explores the use of a more advanced pointer alias analysis to create practical tools for improving software security. We present a context-sensitive, inclusion-based, and field-sensitive points-to analysis for C. We apply the analysis to (1) infer the type of variables in C based on their usage, (2) reduce the overhead of a dynamic bounds checker, and (3) find format string vulnerabilities.
Pointer Alias Analysis
Our analysis is based on a points-to algorithm developed originally for Java [20] using a binary-decision-diagram (BDD) representation. Our analysis is context-sensitive, meaning that calling contexts along different acyclic call paths have distinct points-to relations. It is inclusion-based, meaning that two pointers may point to overlapping but different sets of objects. It is also field-sensitive, meaning that separate fields in an object have distinct points-to relations. The BDD representation efficiently handles the exponential number of contexts by exploiting their similarities. It also accelerates inclusion-based analysis through efficient transitive closure computations [3, 20, 24] . Field-sensitive analyses are known to be much more precise than field-insensitive approaches. Our analysis, however, is flow-insensitive: the order of execution of program statements is not modeled.
Because of the semantics of the C language, a pointer an-alysis for C is much more complex than one for Java. While Java enforces type safety by limiting user access to memory, C affords the user complete, direct control. A C programmer can take the address of any field within an object, treat any portion of memory as a contiguous region of bytes, perform arbitrary address arithmetic, and perform arbitrary object casts, whether between variant types of a union or in complete violation of declared type. Most C compilers allow these actions, even though they may violate the letter or spirit of the C99 standard. A C pointer alias analysis cannot be strictly sound, or else it would conclude that most locations in memory may point to any memory location. Furthermore, proposed C pointer alias analyses have always assumed that the relative placement of objects in memory is undefined, which is typically true in programs for the sake of portability. In this paper we propose a conservative pointer analysis, referred to as cons, that is sound for all programs satisfying this assumption.
Our conservative pointer analysis can be imprecise for programs which conform to the C99 standard. We can obtain more precise results by imposing additional assumptions about C programs which reflect common C usage. We also propose an optimistic analysis, referred to as pcp (practical C pointers), that is not only sound for programs adhering to the C99 standard, but also for programs that may violate the C99 type model in commonly accepted ways. For example, we use structural equivalence to determine type compatibility, whereas C99 resorts to name equivalence for aggregates such as structures and unions.
Like the pointer analysis for Java, we express our pointsto analysis in Datalog, a logic programming language used in deductive databases [17] . We use the bddbddb tool to translate the Datalog rules into efficient BDD operations [20] . The resulting points-to relations can be used in subsequent Datalog programs, making it easy to develop further algorithms based on the results.
Type Inference
The declared types of C variables are only hints indcating how the variables are likely to be used. Type inference determines the actual types of objects by analyzing the usage of those objects. This is of great interest, since it can show that a program is type safe and portable, or identify unsafe program operations that should be audited statically or checked dynamically.
We perform a type inference using the results of our pointer analysis. Using both the pcp and cons models, we found very few instances where type declarations were violated. However, the cons model consistently found more type declaration violations, as well as heap objects with multiple inferred types.
To check the results of our type inference, we instrumented our programs with a dynamic type checker. With only two exceptions, we found that there were no actual type conflicts. Operations which produced type conflicts did not propagate any pointer values, which suggests that the more precise pcp analysis did not exclude any actual pointer aliases.
Optimized Dynamic Buffer Overflow Detection
Buffer overflows are the most common form of security threat in software systems today, consistently dominating CERT advisories [5] . Despite years of effort on this topic, there is no practical static checker that can guarantee to find all buffer overflows automatically. The C semantics make it difficult to create a dynamic bounds checker that can ensure no buffer overflows occur without breaking existing programs.
CRED (C Range Error Detector) is a recently developed dynamic bounds checker that has been shown to work properly on over one million lines of C code [15] . Since buffer overflow exploits tend to be transported as user input strings, CRED can be run with less overhead by checking only string buffer overflows. Such an approach is shown to be effective against a testbed of 20 different buffer overflow attacks [21] .
CRED is based on Jones and Kelly's concept of referent objects [11] . A pointer should only be used to reference an associated referent object. Any derived pointer will have the same referent object as the original pointer. When a pointer is dereferenced, it must point within the bounds of its referent object. CRED uses an object table to dynamically track the base and extent of each object. It instruments pointer arithmetic, dereferences, and string-manipulation functions such as memcpy to associate referent objects with pointer addresses and check that out-of-bounds pointers are not dereferenced.
Normally, CRED enters all referent objects into the object table. To reduce the overhead of the strings-only CRED system, we use our points-to results to inform CRED about objects which do not contain string-typed values. This optimization reduces the overhead of some of the benchmarks by 30% to 100%.
Format String Vulnerabilities
Another common security threat is the format string vulnerability exploit. A program may be exploited if it passes a user-supplied string as the format string argument to a system function such as printf. The user-supplied string may contain format specifiers that can cause the program to write to unintended memory locations. The static detection of user-supplied format strings is an example of a taint analysis, and requires the results of a pointer analysis. We use our pointer analysis to identify strings containing data that may be supplied by the user, and to report instances of format string arguments which point to these tainted strings. We find actual format string vulnerabilities in three of our benchmarks, with false positives in only one.
Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we first describe our C pointer alias analysis based on our pcp model in Section 2. Section 3 presents the cons model. Section 4 discusses our type inference analysis. Section 5 presents our optimizations for the CRED dynamic bounds checker. Section 6 presents our algorithm to find format string vulnerabilities. We report our experimental results in Section 7. Finally, Sections 8 and 9 describe related work and present our conclusions.
THE PCP POINTS-TO ANALYSIS
As discussed in Section 1, our cons analysis assumes disjoint object spaces, which is stated formally in Assumption 1. To increase precision, our pcp (practical C pointers) model makes several additional assumptions reflecting typ-ical C usage. This section describes pcp assumptions and the points-to analysis algorithm. Assumption 1 (Disjoint object spaces) Each object is allocated in a separate memory space; a pointer to an object can only be derived from a pointer to the same object.
Types and Fields
An object may be cast to multiple types during its lifetime, which requires us to consider whether a pointer deposited in a field under one type may be read from a field under another type. The pcp model represents fields as distinct and separate locations, unless it can be proven that they have the same physical location and the same physical layout. We will first discuss references to equivalent fields under identical physical layouts, and then the use of casting to access physically overlapping union variants with different physical layouts.
Structural Equivalence
The C99 standard treats structure and union types as compatible if they are name equivalent. We use a more liberal model of type compatibility, structural equivalence. Under structural equivalence, any two types, regardless of naming, are considered type compatible as long as their physical layout is identical. This is similar to the notion of common initial sequences as specified in the C99 standard. Types that are structurally equivalent are considered to be interchangeable in our model. We also describe fields of two structures (or variants of a union type) as structurally equivalent if they have the same offset and have structurally equivalent field types.
We model an object as having separate locations for each structurally distinct field. Data stored in one field of an object is accessible through any structurally equivalent field in that object. A formal definition of structural equivalence is provided through structural induction:
• Scalar types. Primitive types, such as integers, pointers, chars, floats, doubles, are structurally equivalent if and only if they have the same sizes. A scalar object can be thought of as a field, since it is structurally equivalent to a leading field of a structure with a structurally equivalent field type. • Structures and union types. The ith fields of two structures (or variants of a union type) are considered to be structurally equivalent if the types of the first i − 1 fields are structurally equivalent and the declared types of the ith fields are also structurally equivalent. Fields that are structural equivalent are referred to having a common initial sequence [23] . Two structures are structurally equivalent if they have the same number of fields and all their fields are structurally equivalent.
We normalize C programs by renaming the types and fields such that they have the same names if and only if they are structurally equivalent. This enables us to determine if two fields are structurally equivalent by a simple inspection of their field paths.
Dynamic Variant Types
Objects, most commonly unions, may be cast between multiple types throughout the execution of a C program. If data stored into a field under one variant type is retrieved through a field under another variant type, the exact values read depend on the platform-specific physical layout. This behavior is not defined under the ANSI C standard, which says that data stored into an object under one variant type is not expected to be retrieved when the object is cast to another variant type.
If an object is cast to another structurally nonequivalent type, the pcp model assumes that reads from a field in one variant type will not be used to access data stored to a structurally nonequivalent field in the other variant type.
Assumption 2 (Variant Types) Pointers written to one field can only be retrieved when accessed as fields that are structurally equivalent. Our optimistic model will not recognize that the character 'c' in u.c will be accessed through u.x. 2
Handling of Pointers
Unlike Java references, C pointers can point into the middle of an object. A field address is modeled as a pair o, p , where o is the object name, and p is a field path. Stackallocated objects are given names of the variable; heap objects are named by the allocation sites. A pointer to the base address of an object is known as a base pointer, and has an empty field path denoted as .
The pcp model allows an object to be cast to any type by coercing the type of its base pointer. However, a non-base pointer to a field in the middle of an object cannot be used to access a structure incompatible with the field type. (1) ptr->B2 = NULL;
(2) ptr = (B*)&a.A2;
(3) ptr->B2 = NULL;
(4)
The use of ptr in lines (1) and (2) illustrate a common use of type casts. The base address of a is the same as the address of its first field A1, and can be interpreted as pointing to a structure of either type A or B. Thus, it is safe to calculate the field offset B2 from this address. On the other hand, when ptr points to a.A2, the addressed structure must be treated as type int. The assignment in line (4) could not be modelled using the pcp model, given the address from line (3). 2 Assumption 3 (Field type safety) If a dereference or a field-access operation is applied to a non-base pointer, the referent field type must be structurally equivalent to the type assumed by the operation.
Using type information to eliminate certain points-to relations is not new. Such type-filtering is commonly used in type-safe languages [3, 20] . It helps in removing side effects due to spurious pointers which result from the imprecision of static analysis.
To model this restriction properly, we define the concept of a legal field path. Let t ∈ T be the set of types in the program. Each struct t has a set of canonical fields, denoted F (t). The first field of struct t is known as the leading field. The type of field f is given by type(f ).
We define a legal field path to be a sequence of field names, f1.f2. · · · .fn, such that f1 is a field of some structure t1 and ∀i > 1 : fi ∈ F (type(fi−1)). Note that adding a leading field to a path does not advance the path. We drop all the leading fields from the head and tail of a legal field path to derive a canonical field path.
Example 3 In Example 2, paths , A1 and A1.B1 all point to the base address of an object, whereas B2 and A1.B2 both point to the second field in structure B. The canonical path of the former is and the latter is B2. The path can be used as a pointer to any kind of structure, however, the latter field path can only be used as a pointer to a field of type void*. 2
We say that cpath(p, l ) is true if p is the canonical version of the legal path l. When a field access f is applied to a pointer with a canonical field path p, we check if p can point to a structure of which f is a field. Formally, we ask if there a legal path l such that cpath(p, l ) and cpath(p , l .f). p is the new canonical path representing the location. If l does not exist, then the field access cannot be performed in the pcp model.
We say that safecast(p, t) is true if a canonical path p points to a location of primitive type t. The path of a nonunion field in the middle of an object has a single primitive type, while a union field may be the location of multiple primitive types. Formally, safecast(p, t) is true if p is an empty path, or if p can be extended to form a legal path whose last field is declared to be of primitive type t.
Program Representation
Our analysis implementation uses a relational database to represent objects, types, field paths and operations in a C program. The database can be queried using Datalog, a logic query language [17] . The analysis itself is set of inference rules expressed using Datalog, which capture how we infer the points-to relations from the relational database. Relations are expressed as predicates in Datalog; for example, we say that
A Datalog rule describes a single inference that our analysis should make. For example, the Datalog rule
The first step in building the relational database involves transforming the C program. Since our algorithm is flowinsensitive, we ignore all control flow statements. All remaining C statements are broken down into simple assignment statements on primitively typed variables. For example, an assignment to a field of a structure is decomposed into a field address calculation, followed by a store. Temporary variables are introduced as needed.
All program information relevant to the analysis is then stored in the relational database. Due to space constraints, [alloc] points-to( x, , type(x) , mallocc, ) : -"c : x= malloc(y)"
[address] points-to( x, , type(x) , y, ) : -"x = &y"
[assign] assign( x, , type(x) , y, , type(y) ) : -"x = y" we show only the inference rules for simple assignment statements ( Figure 1 ). For clarity, relations representing simple assignment statements are presented as code in quotes. We say that points-to( o1, p1, t , o2, p2 ) is true if the address of o2, p2 is stored as type t in the field location o1, p1 . We say that assign( o1, p1, t1 , o2, p2, t2 ) is true if the contents at the location of o2, p2 is retrieved as type t2 and stored as type t1 in the location o1, p1 . Inferences are performed on the simple assignment statement relations as follows:
[alloc] c: x = malloc(y); x points to the object allocated, which is named by its allocation site c.
[address]
x = &y; x points to the starting address of y.
[assign]
x = y; This creates an assign relation, which says that the left-hand-side points to what the right-hand-side points to. Rule [prop] propagates the points-to targets from the assign relation source to the destination.
[load]
x = *(t*)y; Check if *y is allowed to be cast to type t; if so, then assign x to what is pointed to by y.
[store] *(t*) x = y; Check if *x is allowed to be cast to type t; if so, then assign y to the locations pointed to by x.
[field]
x = &( ((t*)y)->f ); Check if it is legal to extend the paths pointed to by y with f; if so, assign the resulting canonical path to x.
Arrays and Pointer Arithmetic
Assumption 4 (Pointer arithmetic) Arithmetic is applied only to pointers pointing to an element of an array to compute another element in the same array.
Assumption 4 allows precise modeling of the common usage of in-bounds pointer arithmetic. Precision is gained by leaving uncommon behavior unmodeled, such as buffer overruns, and the casting of data structures into byte arrays in order to access the low-level byte representation.
We model an array type as having two fields: the leading field f1 represents the first element and the second field f2 represents all remaining elements. Both fields are structurally equivalent to type t, the type of the array element. Since f1 is a leading field, any pointer to an array may also be used as a pointer to its element type. Furthermore, if two array types have the same element type, their respective f2 fields are considered structurally equivalent, regardless of the size of the array. However, the array types themselves are considered structurally equivalent only if they have the same sizes.
Arithmetic operations are allowed only on pointers to array elements. For each arithmetic operation, we determine if it may leave the pointer value the same, increment the pointer, or decrement the pointer. The former is modeled as a simple pointer assignment, the latter two are modeled as follows:
1. Incrementing a pointer to field f1 or f2 in an array returns a pointer to f2. 2. Decrementing a pointer to field f2 in an array results in a pointer to both field f2 and f1.
In both cases, the element type of the referent array must be structurally equivalent to the expected element type. Some programs cast pointers to integers for the purposes of performing arithmetic. Expression of the form addr = (int)baseptr + i * n, where n is a constant, are often used to find element i of an array with elements of bytesize n. We substitute equivalent pointer arithmetic expressions for every possible element type of that bytesize. If i does not have a constant multiplier we use char as the element type.
Memory Copy Routines
Routines such as memcpy and strcpy are often used to copy values from one memory region to another, by treating the source destination locations as arrays of bytes and copying a specified number of bytes from the source to the destination. It is difficult to model a copy routine accurately because no expected type information is provided and it is often not possible to determine the range of fields copied.
Assumption 5 (Memcopy)
We assume that the length of a memory copy operation only extends to the end of the largest field type located at the source address. For each type at the source address, we match a common initial sequence of fields with each type at the destination address. We precisely model the operation as an assignment between corresponding fields.
Context-Sensitive Analysis
Our treatment of procedure invocations and context sensitivity is the same as the one used by Whaley and Lam [20] .
Readers are referred to that paper for details. Here we shall only provide an overview of the algorithm for completeness.
To handle indirect function calls, the algorithm first computes the context-insensitive points-to relations while discovering call targets on the fly. The algorithm then uses the call graph computed to find the context-sensitive points-to relations.
The analysis starts by extracting all the input relations from the source program and store them as relations in the database. In the context-insensitive phase, assignment relations linking the actual with the formal parameters are generated on-the-fly as the function targets are discovered. The inference rules are applied until no more points-to relations are discovered.
Context sensitivity is handled with cloning. Cloning conceptually generates multiple instances of a function such that every distinct calling context invokes a different instance, thus preventing information from one context from flowing to another. Cloning makes generating context-sensitive results algorithmically trivial: the contextinsensitive algorithm can be applied to the cloned program to obtain context-sensitive results. Note that the analysis does not clone the code per se; it simply produces a separate answer for each clone. Contexts are distinguished using reduced call paths. In a program without recursion, the entire call path is used. In a program with recursion, call paths are reduced by eliminating all invocations whose callers and callees belong to the same strongly connected component in the call graph.
A location in a stack-allocated object in the contextsensitive analysis is represented as c, o, p , where c is the context number identifying the clone in the call graph, o is the local variable, and p represents the path taken to reach the location. Context-sensitive relations and inference rules are analogous to the context-insensitive ones, except that stack allocated objects are qualified with a context number.
The call graph computed in the first pass is used to create the clones for each function. Assignment statements are generated before the analysis begins, linking the actual arguments of each instance to the formal parameter of the matching instance of the callee function. We then compute the context-sensitive points-to relations by applying inference rules to the expanded call graph until no more new relations are generated.
CONSERVATIVE POINTS-TO MODEL
Our conservative model, cons, includes the inference rules in the pcp model, as well as additional rules to model program behavior which falls outside assumptions of the pcp model. The points-to relations found by the pcp model are a subset of the relations found by the cons model. cons, assumes only that displacements between objects are undefined (Assumption 1):
1. Contrary to Assumption 2, any read from a field also retrieves values from any possibly overlapping field. 2. Contrary to Assumption 3, we might dereference a pointer of type * t pointing to path p, where there is no type t field. All fields at p are accessed by the dereference, as well as all fields following p, since the range of the dereference may span into those fields as well.
Contrary to Assumption 3, we may lookup field f1
in type t1 relative to path p, where there is no type t1 field. cons will return the address of every field following p which can overlap with a hypothetical f1 field. 4. In the pcp model, arithmetic is applied only to pointers to an array element to derive pointers pointing to another element in the same array (Assumption 4). Unless it is proven otherwise, the cons model assumes that a computed pointer may point to anywhere in the object pointed to by the source pointer. 5. pcp assumes that memcpy will only copy data up to the end of the largest field type pointed to by the source pointer, and only to structurally equivalent fields in the destination. (Assumption 5). cons copies data beyond the end of the largest field, and the destination location does not need to be structurally equivalent.
TYPE INFERENCE
The declared type of a C variable may not reflect its actual type, since the address can be arbitrarily cast and dereferenced. However, we can infer the actual type of objects from their uses. Such information helps programmers understand the code, as conflicts between declared and inferred types flag dubious coding practice that can lead to obscure bugs. Knowing the types of objects also can be useful for code optimizations.
The type of an object is found by identifying accessed field paths in that object. For each accessed path, we know that the object was cast to a structure type containing that field path. An object has a single type only if all accessed field paths belong to a common structure type. We can then query the results of our type inference to find objects cast as multiple types. This can indicate that a declared type has been violated, or that multiple variant types of a union are being used in the same object.
OPTIMIZED CRED
The CRED bounds checker imposes two kinds of runtime overheads. The first occurs from maintaining the object table as stack and heap objects are allocated and deallocated. The second occurs as address computations and string manipulations are checked for OOB addresses. We optimize the first kind of overhead by only entering objects which can possibly be referenced by string operations.
The overhead of inserting objects into the table can be large. CRED inserts all dynamically created objects into the table, as well as all stack-allocated variables whose addresses have been taken in the code. Even though the strings-only version of CRED only checks for overflows in strings, CRED enters all addressed objects into the object table, for fear that non-string objects may be dynamically cast as strings.
We identify objects containing strings by finding the referent objects of operations that operate on strings with the results of our points-to analysis. Any object addressed by pointer p must be entered into the table if: 1. p is the base address in a char* pointer arithmetic expression (including those converted from int arithmetic expressions). 2. p is used as an argument to a string-manipulating external library function such as strcat or the memcpy family of routines.
Having identified all possible string-containing objects, we inform CRED so that it can omit the rest from the object table.
FORMAT STRING VULNERABILITIES
The detection of format string vulnerabilities requires a taint analysis to determine which object fields may contain data originally derived from user input. We could perform dynamic taint analysis, such as Perl provides, whereby user inputs and derived data are determined to be tainted. However, a dynamic analysis can only detect a vulnerability given appropriate test inputs, and it will incur a runtime overhead if used as a preventative measure. Static analysis, on the other hand, has the benefit of finding all potential vulnerabilities before the program is run.
We define source objects to be all objects directly under user control which originate taint. These include elements of the argv array, the return results of IO functions, and functions interacting with the environment such as getenv. We find source objects using parameter and return value references from selected system functions.
Every field in a source object is considered to be tainted. Taint is propagated to other object fields through direct and indirect assignments found by our pointer analysis. Objects referenced by the format string argument of a function such as printf are considered sink objects. A tainted sink object indicates a potential format string vulnerability.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have implemented and run the described analyses on a suite of 12 benchmarks. In this section we discuss the results of our pointer analysis, static type inference query, dynamic type verification, dynamic string-buffer bounds checking, and static format string vulnerability query.
Experimental Setup
We have chosen a suite of 12 benchmarks, including commonly used Unix systems software, security-critical daemon programs, and standardized SPEC 2000 benchmarks. ffingerd is a finger daemon, polymorph is a filename conversion program, bzip2 is a compression utility, pcre is a regular expression library, bftpd is an FTP server, gzip is a compression utility, mcf is a scheduling program, muh is a network game, monkey is a Web server, enscript is a program for converting text to PostScript, crafty is a chess playing program, and hypermail is a program for converting mailbox files into HTML. Table 1 shows the versions of the programs analyzed, the number of lines of code in the program source as well as the number of lines after preprocessing with blank lines ignored. Runtime measurements were taken on an AMD Opteron 150 machine with 1GB of memory running Linux. We used the test cases provided; when test cases were not available, we created appropriately large test files composed of common inputs.
Our analysis begins by transforming a program into a collection of simplified operations and building a set of BDD relations. After compiling and linking using the SUIF 2 compiler framework [1] , we number objects (distinguishing between SSA versions), normalize types and field names, and map legal field paths to canonical paths. We use the BuDDy BDD libraryto build BDD relations which represent program operations and path relationships. The time spent creating the initial program representation is reported in the fifth column of Table 1.
Pointer Analysis
Implementing the basic context-insensitive pcp analysis required 32 Datalog inference rules. In addition, we defined 200 external system calls through the use of additional rules which model each system call as inlined program oper- Table 1 : Analysis times of the benchmark suite. In this and other tables in the paper, benchmarks are sorted by the preprocessed line count. Blank lines are not included in the line counts.
ations. Implementing a context-sensitive analysis required converting the existing rules to augment each occurrence of an object variable with an accompanying context variable, as well as augmenting the assignments of actual arguments to formal parameters with a proper context numbering. Implementing cons analysis required adding an additional 26 rules to the base pcp versions. The pcp model requires fewer rules thanks to its simplistic assumptions. The cons analysis must define additional rules for each case that the pcp model ignores. These rules create new relations which can propagate further, and increase the runtime of the cons analysis. The choice of BDD variable domain ordering can significantly affect the performance of a Datalog program. We used the ordering automatically discovered by the bddbddb tool [20] .
In context-insensitive pcp mode, most of the benchmarks take under 6 seconds to run, except for our largest 4 benchmarks, of which hypermail solves in 48.1 seconds. cons modes, on average, takes about 2.5 times as long as pcp modes, with the worst case of enscript taking 5 times as long in context-sensitive cons mode. As noted, cons analyses may take longer due to an increased ruleset and additional iterations of rule applications as non-pcp relation tuples propagate. The context-sensitive analyses take, on average, almost 3 times as long as the context-insensitive analyses. This is a small slowdown in return for points-to results for an exponential number of calling contexts.
Static Type Checking
In Table 2 we present the results of our static type inference Datalog query. We have separately counted the number of stack and heap-allocated objects with multiple types, and have provided the total number of stack and heap objects for comparison. The results using pcp and cons modes are listed in separate columns, and context-insensitive results are listed in parentheses where different from contextsensitive results.
In every benchmark, additional objects are found with multiple types in cons mode than those found in pcp mode. However, the vast majority of stack objects have single types. This is also true for heap objects in pcp mode, but a large proportion of heap objects have multiple types in cons mode. These results show that we can determine the actual type of most program objects. Only a small number require closer attention, which is more often in regards to user-allocated objects.
Dynamic Type Checking
We perform dynamic type checking to identify program behavior which violates the actual type of program objects. We have instrumented our benchmarks to verify that every object is treated as having a single type over its lifetime, and that every dereference, array element-and field-address calculation is consistent with its type. We also test that source and destination types match in routines such as memcpy. Dynamic checking can only show that a program is type safe for the given input, not for all possible runs.
We have implemented a dynamic type checker using the CRED buffer overflow detection framework. We augment the CRED object table to track each object's type, which we represent as a linear sequence of bytes. Types are determined statically for local variables. The type of a global or dynamically allocated object is taken to be the type of its first dereference. This imprecision can result in false positive type violations, which we remove by hand.
If an object's type contains union-typed fields, we keep a list of possible variant types. We remove variant types from this list as we find them to be incompatible with subsequent operations. If the list of candidate union fields is exhausted, we report a type violation. Out of 10 benchmarks (we were unable to test bftpd or muh using the CRED system), only two were found to contain objects treated with more than one type. This is an unusual event in portable programs, as it requires making assumptions about the size and alignments of C's types. hypermail was found to cast a double to an array of characters in order to access it byte by byte. bzip2 casts an array of 32-bit integers to an array of 16-bit shorts. In both of these cases, assumptions are violated to get at the low-level representation of numeric data. Fortunately, though these casts would violate the pcp model, code inspection showed that they were not involved in the propagation of pointer values.
Optimization of CRED
We have used our pointer analysis to optimize CRED by ommiting non-string objects from the object table. To evaluate, we compare each uninstrumented program with the CRED instrumented version, as well as CRED instrumentations optimized by the four variations of our pointer analysis. For each compilation we measure runtime, the number of stack and heap instances entered and removed from the object table, and the number of checked operations performed.
The first two columns of Table 3 For the most part, our pcp and cons analyses identified the same objects as non-strings. However, in gzip, 100% of inserted heap objects were determined to be non-strings by our pcp analysis, while 0% were found to be non-strings by our cons analysis. enscript showed a smaller disagreement in the number of non-string heap objects. Most stack objects were determined to be non-string objects, with proportions higher than 87% in 8 out of 10 benchmarks.
We were able to optimize the performance of CRED by preventing it from inserting non-string objects. Table 4 displays the normal runtime for each program, the percentage overhead due to CRED, and the percentage overhead due to each optimized version of CRED. We find that ffingerd, bzip2, polymorph, gzip, and monkey have a negligible overhead. At the other extreme, hypermail's overhead is over 3 times the base runtime, and the overhead for pcre is about 1.5 times the base runtime. The other benchmarks have around a 30% overhead. Our optimizations caused a complete reduction in overhead for pcre. crafty's overhead is reduced by more than half, and hypermail's overhead is reduced by a third. mcf's overhead came from a bad interaction with CRED's custom malloc implementation, which we were unable to affect.
We also investigated how well these optimizations combined with alternative optimization techniques. After examining the most frequently fired checks in hypermail and enscript, we manually optimized the heavily executed portions of the programs using two strategies. We first eliminated redundant bounds checks dominated by earlier checks. Later dereferences were removed if we ascertained that they were redundant. Often, a pointer would be dereferenced twice or more in an inner loop. Comparisons in test conditions were also a common source of redundant checks.
For loops with monotonically increasing or decreasing index variables, we performed code motion to move checks outside the loop. This way, a check fired multiple times was replaced with a single check for an entire range of indices. enscript relied heavily on simple inner loops which could be optimized in this manner. Using these techniques, we were able to decrease the number of string checks fired in hypermail by 52%, and in enscript by 25%. enscript's CRED overhead was reduced from 19% to 16%, with no further improvement due to our string-object optimizations. hypermail's CRED overhead was reduced from 387% to 246%, and optimized CRED overhead was reduced from about 270% to only 170%. We conclude that the benefit of CRED optimizations are not overshadowed by other optimizations. Table 5 shows the results of our format string vulnerability analysis. Column 1 lists the number of callsites where tainted user data originates. The next two columns display the number of objects containing tainted data from the source objects. Column 4 lists the number of callsites for functions with format strings. Column 5 lists the number of format string sink objects which are not string constants. The last two columns report the number of actual vulnerabilities and the number of false warnings. Each vulnerability is a pair of source and sink callsites where tainted data flows from a source object of the first callsite to a sink object of the second.
Format String Vulnerabilities
The vulnerabilities discovered in bftpd and muh are known vulnerabilities. We were not aware of vulnerabilites in monkey, but by manually inspecting the source code we determined that the format strings could be manipulated by the user in 9 of the reported cases. The remaining programs do not have non-constant format string objects to be considered vulnerable.
We found the same number of vulnerabilities, regardless of the pointer analysis model we used. However, the cons model clearly produces more tainted objects than the pcp model. Context-insensitive pointer relations also produce additional tainted objects, which is most dramatic for hypermail. We suspect that in programs with more nonconstant sink objects we would see a difference in the number of vulnerabilities between analysis models.
RELATED WORK
Space limitations preclude us from reviewing the large volume of research on pointer alias analysis in detail. Since this paper presents a field-sensitive, context-and flowinsensitive, inclusion-based analysis, we shall limit our discussion to similar projects.
Inclusion-based analyses [2] generate significantly more precise results than equivalence-based ones [16] . Zhu [24] and Berndl et al. [3] showed that BDDs can be used effectively to implement inclusion-based points-to analysis. Their algorithm can be formulated and implemented by simply applying a set of inference rules until they converge. This simplicity makes it relatively easy for us to experiment with the intricate semantics of C. Prior to the use of BDDs, scalable inclusion-based algorithms had to include optimizations to compute closures of points-to relations [8, 10] . Contextsensitive versions of BDD-based points-to analysis for Java and C have been proposed recently [20, 25] .
A number of field-sensitive inclusion-based analyses have been proposed for Java [3, 13, 14, 19] . Because of typesafety, however, Java is much easier to handle. Field sensitivity is more complicated with C because of casting and pointer arithmetic. A number of proposed algorithms distinguish between fields of structures in C, but do not handle casting [2, 6, 7 ]. Steensgaard's algorithm handles casting; however, it is an equivalence-based rather than an inclusionbased analysis and is therefore less precise [16] . Yong et al. [23] propose the use of common initial sequences; Ryder et al. [12] and Wilson and Lam [22] propose using an offsetbased approach.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a context-sensitive, inclusionbased, and field-sensitive points-to analysis for C. We used the analysis to find objects that potentially have multiple types, to improve a dynamic bounds checker, and to statically detect format string vulnerabilities.
To gain precise C pointer analysis results, we proposed a pcp model which captures the common usage of C. We compared pcp with a conservative cons model. The pcp model found fewer multi-type objects than the cons model, a result which was more consistent with results we obtained from a dynamic type checker. We also found that the pcp model improved the accuracy of the format string vulnerability detector.
We showed that C pointer alias analysis can be used to reduce the overhead of a dynamic string-buffer bounds checker. It significantly reduced the overhead for programs dominated by the insertion of non-string objects into the bounds checker's obejct table. Finally, our analysis found twelve actual format string vulnerabilities in the programs we analyzed, with false positives in only one of the programs.
